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Flexicurity policies comprise a relatively novel approach to the regulation of work and welfare that aims
to combine labour market ﬂexibility with social security. Advocates of this approach argue that, by
striking the right balance between ﬂexibility and security, ﬂexicurity policies allow ﬁrms to take ad-
vantage of loose contractual arrangements in an increasingly competitive economic environment while
simultaneously protecting workers from the adverse health and social consequences of ﬂexible forms of
employment. In this study, we use multilevel Poisson regression models to test the theoretical claim of
the ﬂexicurity approach using data for 23 countries across three waves of the European Social Survey. We
construct an institutional typology of labour market regulation and social security to evaluate whether
inequalities in self-reported health and limiting longstanding illness between temporary workers and
their permanent counterparts are smaller in countries that most closely approximate the ideal type
described by advocates of the ﬂexicurity approach. Our results indicate that, while the association be-
tween temporary employment and health varies across countries, institutional conﬁgurations of labour
market regulation and social security do not provide a meaningful explanation for this cross-national
variation. Contrary to the expectations of the ﬂexicurity hypothesis, our data do not indicate that em-
ployment-related inequalities are smaller in countries that approximate the ﬂexicurity approach. We
discuss potential explanations for these ﬁndings and conclude that there remains a relative lack of
evidence in support of the theoretical claims of the ﬂexicurity approach.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
In contemporary debates over the future of work and welfare, it
has become common practice to suggest that the governments of
advanced capitalist economies face an increasingly difﬁcult bind
between two conﬂicting sets of demands (Wilthagen & Tros,
2004). On the one hand, due to real or perceived changes in the
structure of the global economy, there is a growing demand
among employers for more ﬂexible labour market arrangements
that allow them to hire and ﬁre workers with fewer restrictions
and costs. On the other hand, workers continue to advocate for the
provision of generous and comprehensive levels of socialLtd. This is an open access article u
.V. Shahidi).protection in order to offset the insecurity that results from such
arrangements.
In recent years, the notion of ﬂexicurity has been introduced by
a diverse range of social and political actors as a seemingly effec-
tive means of resolving this difﬁcult bind and bridging the divide
between these conﬂicting sets of expectations (Auer, 2010; Burroni
& Keune, 2011; Muffels & Wilthagen, 2013). Flexicurity describes a
relatively novel approach to the regulation of the work-welfare
nexus that aims to combine labour market ﬂexibility through loose
contractual regulations with adequate levels of social security.
Although this policy conﬁguration requires workers to make
concessions around job security, the approach is said to offset the
impact of labour market deregulation through the use of active
labour market policies that promote employability and generous
income replacement measures that compensate for short spells of
unemployment.nder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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ﬂexibility and security are incompatible (Vosko, 2006). It suggests,
instead, that powerful complementarities can be forged between
the two. By striking the right balance between ﬂexibility and se-
curity, advocates of the ﬂexicurity approach argue that ﬂexicurity
policies are capable of securing both the demands of capital for
ﬂexibility and the demands of labour for security (e.g. European
Commission, 2010; Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development, 2013). On this basis, they argue that labour market
regulations can be relaxed without causing concomitant harms to
the welfare of individual workers.
Despite having far-reaching implications, the theoretical claims
of the ﬂexicurity approach have gone largely-untested (Afzal,
Muntaner, Chung, 2013; Burchell, 2009). Thus, it is as of yet un-
clear whether governments can pursue labour market ﬂexibility
without compromising—among other things—the health and
well-being of workers. Drawing on a multilevel modeling strategy,
our study aims to evaluate this theoretical claim, with a speciﬁc
focus on inequalities in self-reported health and limiting long-
standing illness between temporary workers and their perma-
nently-employed counterparts. Ultimately, we are interested in
examining whether and to what extent ﬂexicurity policies at-
tenuate the health-related consequences associated with tempor-
ary employment.2. The rise of ﬂexible employment conditions
In the years immediately following the Second World War,
European employment and social policies were dramatically
transformed (Huber & Stephens, 2001). Western European coun-
tries, in particular, developed expansive labour market regulations
and comprehensive social security policies to protect workers
from a diverse range of socio-economic risks (e.g. unemployment)
that increasingly came to be viewed as structural features of the
operation of markets under capitalism (Esping-Andersen, 1990).
These institutional transformations were fuelled by favourable
macro-economic conditions and relatively strong labour move-
ments whose political demands for protection became increas-
ingly difﬁcult to ignore. It is within this broad historical context
that the “standard employment relationship” emerged (Quinlan,
Mayhew & Bohle, 2001). The standard model of employment de-
scribes permanent, full-time employment that provides generous
beneﬁts and relatively strong levels of job security.
By the middle of the 1970s, a series of economic crises replaced
earlier trajectories of prosperity and uninterrupted growth with
rapidly rising levels of unemployment and declining rates of
proﬁtability. This end to the so-called “golden age of capitalism”
signaled a fundamental shift both in the institutional makeup of
advanced capitalist countries and the relative balance of power
between capital and labour (Bambra, Netuveli & Eikemo, 2010;
Huber & Stephens, 2001). As a result of these shifts, labour market
regulations, and the welfare state more generally, were increas-
ingly viewed as institutional distortions that interfered with the
proper functioning of capitalist markets. Neoliberal reforms were
presented as necessary remedies for persistent levels of economic
stagnation and unemployment (Glyn, 2006).
The expansion of ﬂexible forms of employment conditions was
a direct consequence of these neoliberal reform efforts (Quinlan
et al., 2001). Employers argued that labour market rigidities re-
stricting ﬂexible hiring and ﬁring practices undermined the ability
for ﬁrms to adapt their labour force to rapid changes in market
demand and, by extension, undermined their prospects for success
in an increasingly competitive global economy. The governments
of advanced capitalist countries, responding to the growing poli-
tical power of capital, committed themselves to deregulatinglabour markets and loosening restrictions on hiring and ﬁring
(Emmenegger, 2009). To varying extents, national governments
stripped their labour markets of alleged rigidities and, as a con-
sequence, paved the way for a rise of ﬂexible forms of employment
conditions, including temporary employment contracts (Auer &
Cazes, 2003).
Not surprisingly, the growth of ﬂexible employment conditions
has attracted the attention of public health scholars, who argue
that these changes have negatively impacted the health and well-
being of the labour force. In the remainder of this paper, we focus
speciﬁcally on the health consequences of temporary employment.3. The social and health consequences of temporary
employment
Employment conditions are important determinants of health
(Muntaner, Chung & Solar, 2010a). As labour market ﬂexibilization
has led to a substantial erosion in the quality and stability of
employment conditions (Kalleberg, 2009), the need to account for
these determinants of health has increased over time (Benach &
Muntaner, 2007). Public health researchers have drawn on the
concept of precariousness as a way of capturing the adverse
health-related consequences of changing employment conditions
(Vives, Amable & Ferrer, 2010). They have described at least ﬁve
pathways that are assumed to link ﬂexible—and, more speciﬁcally,
temporary—employment to health (Benavides, Benach & Munta-
ner, 2006; Muntaner, Solar & Vanroelen, 2010b).
3.1. Continuity
Temporary employment is characterized by higher levels of job
insecurity (Lewchuk, Clarke & de Wolff, 2008). There is strong
evidence of a causal relationship between job insecurity, dis-
continuous employment histories, and health (Sirviö, Ek & Joke-
lainen, 2012). Speciﬁcally, compared to those in stable and secure
employment, workers that report facing an objective or subjective
threat of job loss exhibit worse physical and mental health
outcomes.
3.2. Earnings
Temporary employment may lead to unpredictable or in-
sufﬁcient levels of earnings, resulting in cumulative and chronic
exposures to economic deprivation and ﬁnancial strain (Ferrie,
Shipley & Newman, 2005). Such experiences are, in turn, asso-
ciated with material and psychosocial stressors, of which the ne-
gative consequences for health are well-documented in the ex-
isting literature (Kahn & Pearlin, 2006).
3.3. Legal protection
Labour laws designed to protect workers are often organized
around the standard model of permanent employment. Many are
therefore poorly suited to protect workers employed on temporary
contracts. As a result, temporary workers may be denied statutory
protections, including the right to refuse unsafe work (Benavides
et al., 2006). Furthermore, they are less likely to be protected
against unhealthy working conditions through such mechanisms
as labour legislation, collective bargaining, and union membership
(Benach, Vives & Amable, 2014).
3.4. Beneﬁts
Many of the social policies of advanced capitalist countries are
premised on a template of permanent employment that does not
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(Clasen & Clegg, 2011). Due to their discontinuous and irregular
work histories, temporary workers are often ineligible (or only
partially eligible) to receive social security beneﬁts that provide
protection against socio-economic risks, including unemployment,
sickness, disability, and retirement (Emmenegger, Häusermann &
Palier, 2012). The health-promoting potential of social security
beneﬁts is well-established (Cylus and Glymour, 2015). By exten-
sion, the absence of social security coverage poses a signiﬁcant risk
to the health and well-being of temporary workers.
3.5. Power
The power relationships under which temporary employees
work differ dramatically from those that characterize standard
employment contracts. In particular, the former experience dis-
proportionately lower levels of control over various features of
their immediate workplace environments, such as the pace, con-
tent, and organization of work (Gallagher, 2005). The experience
of feeling powerless at one's place of employment has been
identiﬁed as an important psychosocial stressor that is associated
with a range of adverse health outcomes (Bosmans, De Cuyper &
Hardonk, 2015).
Notwithstanding these established pathways linking tempor-
ary employment to adverse physical and mental health outcomes,
empirical research on the health effects of temporary employment
has generated mixed ﬁndings (Benach et al., 2014; Virtanen, Ki-
vimäki & Joensuu, 2005). Inconsistencies have emerged, for ex-
ample, between studies that report worse health outcomes (e.g.
Benavides, Duran & Gimeno, 2015; Inoue, Minami & Yano, 2014;
Kim, Khang & Muntaner, 2008; Minelli, Pigini & Chiavarini, 2014;
Pirani and Salvini, 2015; Quesnel-Vallée, DeHaney & Ciampi, 2010;
Waenerlund et al., 2011) and those that report similar or better
outcomes among temporary workers (e.g. Bardasi & Francesconi,
2004; De Moortel, Vandenheede & Vanroelen, 2014; Liukkonen,
Virtanen & Kivimäki, 2004; Virtanen, Vahtera & Kivimäki, 2002).
The contradictory ﬁndings generated by this body of scholar-
ship have given rise to a number of scientiﬁc and policy questions
regarding the health effects of temporary employment. Chief
among these is whether the observed inconsistency in research
ﬁndings is explained by systematic differences in the individual
experience of temporary employment across national contexts. In
a recent review of empirical studies on the health effects of ﬂex-
ible employment, Kim, Muntaner, and Shahidi (2012) note that the
adverse health-related consequences of ﬂexible employment ap-
pear to be more pronounced in countries characterized by liberal
welfare state arrangements and less pronounced in countries that
display more social democratic welfare state characteristics. This
evidence of systematic, cross-national differences in the associa-
tion between ﬂexible employment and health suggests that there
is a need for public health researchers to better account for the
effect on this association of the national context in which it takes
place. Indeed, prior research has demonstrated the critical im-
portance of national institutional conﬁgurations in shaping the
magnitude of employment-related health inequalities (Bambra &
Eikemo, 2009; McLeod, Hall & Siddiqi, 2012). This body of scho-
larship suggests that policies generous in their purpose and
comprehensive in their scope have the potential to attenuate the
harmful consequences of adverse labour market conditions, in-
cluding ﬂexibility.4. Enter ﬂexicurity
The governments of advanced capitalist countries have en-
gaged in a calculated search for a new regulatory model that iscapable of reconciling the seemingly contradictory demands they
face from employers for greater labour market ﬂexibility and
workers for social security. According to advocates of the ﬂex-
icurity approach, ﬂexibility and security are not contradictory
policy objectives but rather complementary agendas that can be
pursued simultaneously and in a synergistic fashion (Wilthagen &
Tros, 2004).
The ﬂexicurity approach claims to offer an institutional blue-
print for non-precarious forms of ﬂexibility. This blueprint sug-
gests that the link between ﬂexible employment and negative
health and social outcomes can be interrupted and even overcome
through the provision of generous and comprehensive social se-
curity measures (Bosch, 2004; MacAllister, Nylén & Backhans,
2016). The approach therefore presents itself as a framework ac-
cording to which social security systems can attenuate the adverse
health consequences associated with increasingly ﬂexible labour
markets. At the core of this institutional blueprint lie three key
dimensions of social intervention (Bekker & Wilthagen, 2008).
First, the framework suggests that extensive levels of employ-
ment protection legislation that restrict the ability for employers
to use diverse hiring and ﬁring practices are viewed as obstacles to
labour market inclusion. Accordingly, it describes the need for
loose contractual arrangements that encourage labour market
entry and re-entry, particularly among the most vulnerable seg-
ments of the population. This is to be achieved, for example, by
relaxing the conditions that allow for lawful dismissals or lowering
the level of sanctions associated with the use of unlawful dis-
missals. Second, the framework encourages the implementation of
comprehensive active labour market policies to promote employ-
ability and adaptability among workers. These include the creation
of job training schemes, the expansion of public employment
services, or the use of public employment subsidies. Finally, the
framework calls for inclusive social protection systems that pro-
vide adequate compensation for the loss of income associated with
unemployment. For instance, governments can enact reforms to
increase the generosity or population coverage of unemployment
beneﬁts.
Drawing on this institutional blueprint, advocates of the ap-
proach suggest that ﬂexicurity policies can operate as effective
buffers against the adverse health and social consequences asso-
ciated with temporary employment. It is assumed, in other words,
that by promoting employability, adaptability, and compensation
for the experience of unemployment, ﬂexicurity policies will allow
workers to better cope with ﬂexible employment conditions
(Berglund, Furåker & Vulkan, 2014; Sjöberg, 2010).
While there is no shortage of debate surrounding the theore-
tical basis of the ﬂexicurity approach (Burroni & Keune, 2011),
there is a lack of evidence to support its core argument that gov-
ernments can pursue greater labour market ﬂexibility without
sacriﬁcing the health and well-being of its workers (Afzal et al.,
2013). Our paper aims to ﬁll this gap in the literature by testing the
hypothesis that employment-related health inequalities between
temporary workers and their permanently-employed counterparts
are smaller in countries that pursue the institutional blueprint
described by advocates of the ﬂexicurity approach.5. Methods
5.1. Data
Individual-level data were retrieved from waves 4, 5, and 6 of
the European Social Survey (ESS) (2008/2010/2012). The ESS is a
survey conducted every two years that collects comparable cross-
national data on social and political attitudes and outcomes in
Europe. Observations were collected from three waves of the ESS
Table 1
Descriptive Characteristics of the Study Sample (ESS 2008–2012).
Country N Type of Contract (%) Age Sex (%)
Permanent Temporary Male Female
Austria 1869 91.1 8.9 39.8 49.6 50.4
Belgium 2221 90.1 9.9 40.7 50.3 49.7
Bulgaria 2288 85.0 15.0 44.5 44.4 55.6
Czech Republic 2688 85.5 14.5 42.2 54.8 45.2
Denmark 2246 92.0 8.0 43.9 50.4 49.6
Estonia 2498 91.0 9.0 42.5 43.3 56.7
Finland 2682 86.4 13.6 42.9 50.8 49.2
France 2474 87.5 12.5 41.6 47.0 53.0
Germany 3836 86.1 13.9 42.7 53.2 46.8
Greece 1012 85.5 14.5 39.1 45.4 54.6
Hungary 1950 86.7 13.3 40.7 47.8 52.2
Ireland 1644 79.7 20.3 40.1 42.9 57.1
Lithuania 1323 89.4 10.6 43.3 40.1 59.9
Netherlands 2459 83.8 16.2 41.9 48.1 51.9
Norway 2601 89.9 10.1 42.2 54.1 45.9
Poland 1960 70.8 29.2 39.1 52.3 47.7
Portugal 1809 83.3 16.7 40.5 45.4 54.6
Slovakia 2083 88.3 11.7 42.8 44.9 55.1
Slovenia 1532 82.8 17.2 40.5 49.7 50.3
Spain 2292 77.5 22.5 40.1 53.1 46.9
Sweden 2511 90.0 10.0 42.5 49.0 51.0
Switzerland 2354 93.3 6.7 41.5 51.5 48.5
United Kingdom 2516 89.9 10.1 41.6 44.5 55.5
Fig. 1. Summary Indicator of Employment Protection Legislation Across 23 Eur-
opean Countries (2008–2012). Sources: OECD Employment Protection Database;
Tonin (2009)
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meaningful operationalization of multilevel models. Observations
from 23 countries were included in the analysis: Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Although data were avail-
able for a handful of other countries, these were not included ei-
ther due to small samples sizes or by virtue of the fact that they
could not be meaningfully classiﬁed into the institutional typology
used in the analysis. The analysis was restricted to formally em-
ployed working-age adults (18–64 years). The ﬁnal sample con-
sisted of 50,848 observations. Table 1 describes the key char-
acteristics of the sample.
5.2. Individual-level variables
The main individual-level independent variable was type of
employment contract. It was operationalized as a dummy variable
using a single question asking respondents if their contract is
permanent or temporary in duration. The main outcome variables
were self-reported health and limiting longstanding illness. Self-
reported health was measured using a single ﬁve-category ques-
tion asking respondents to rate their overall health. The variable
was dichotomized to “good” (very good or good) and “poor” (fair,
bad, or very bad). Self-reported limiting longstanding illness was
measured using a single three-category question that asked re-
spondents if they were hampered in their daily activities by any
longstanding illness, disability, inﬁrmity, or mental health pro-
blem. The variable was dichotomized to “yes” (yes a lot or yes to
some extent) and “no”.
Five individual-level control variables were included to control
for age, sex, education, marital status, and working hours. Age was
operationalized as a continuous variable. We tested for non-linear
relationships with age and determined the linear term to be an
adequate ﬁt. Sex was operationalized as a dummy variable. Three
categories of educational attainment were created: less than sec-
ondary, secondary, and post-secondary. Four categories of marital
status were identiﬁed: married or civil union, separated ordivorced, widowed, or single. Working hours was operationalized
using an item that asked respondents to list the total number of
contracted hours in their main job excluding paid or unpaid
overtime.
5.3. Contextual-level variables
The main contextual-level independent variable was a two-
dimensional typology capturing institutional interactions between
labour market regulation and social security at the country level.
Labour market regulation was measured using the employment
protection legislation index included in the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development Employment Protection Da-
tabase (OECD, 2016a). Drawing on an established methodology
(OECD, 2013), a summary indicator on the strictness of employ-
ment protection was constructed by averaging combined scores
for permanent employment, temporary employment, and dis-
missals over the period of the study (2008–2012). Values for the
summary indicator are depicted in Fig. 1. For the purpose of our
typology, we distinguish between countries that fall above and
below the mean employment protection score of 2.35. We de-
scribe these countries as having ﬂexible or strict labour market
regulations, respectively.
Social security was measured using a combination of two in-
dicators included in the OECD Beneﬁts and Wages Database (OECD,
2016b): social expenditure on active labour market policies and
national unemployment insurance replacement rates for the long-
term unemployed. The expenditure variable was adjusted to ac-
count for cross-national differences in GDP and levels of un-
employment. Following Picot (2012), we focus on replacement
rates for the long-term unemployed, because temporary workers
do not, in most cases, qualify for a country's main unemployment
beneﬁt. Values for both indicators of social security are depicted in
Fig. 2. For the purpose of our typology, we distinguish between
countries that exhibit high levels of effort on both dimensions of
social security and those that exhibit low levels of effort on one or
both of these dimensions.
On the basis of our two-dimensional analysis, we identify four
clusters of countries, each corresponding to a distinct institutional
conﬁguration of labour market regulation and social security
(Table 2). Notably, similar country clusters have been in-
dependently produced by other researchers (Chung, 2012; Eur-
opean Commission, 2006; Maselli, 2010; Muffels & Luijkx, 2005;
Philips & Eamets, 2007). They have therefore proven relatively
robust to different theoretical and methodological assumptions
Fig. 2. Social Security Effort Across 23 European Countries (2008–2012). Source:
OECD Beneﬁts and Wages Database.
Table 2
Institutional Typology of Labour Market Regulation and Social Security.
Labour market regulation
Strict Flexible
Social security
effort
Insecure Greece; Lithuania;
Portugal; Slovenia;
Spain
Bulgaria; Czech Republic; Es-
tonia; Hungary; Ireland; Po-
land; Slovakia; United
Kingdom
Secure Austria; Belgium;
France; Germany;
Norway
Denmark; Finland; Nether-
lands; Sweden; Switzerland
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The ﬁrst cluster (Greece, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovenia, and
Spain) includes countries that combine strict labour market reg-
ulations with low levels of social security. In these countries, the
use of ﬂexible forms of employment is strictly regulated. However,
welfare state policies in these countries are largely under-
developed and do little to protect the working-age population
from adverse socio-economic experiences, including unemploy-
ment and poverty. The second cluster (Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, and Norway) includes countries that combine loose la-
bour market regulations with high levels of social security. As in
the previous cluster, the use of ﬂexible employment contracts is
strictly regulated. In the second group of countries, however,
welfare state policies are considerably more generous and com-
prehensive. The third cluster (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Ireland, Poland, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom) in-
cludes countries that demonstrate high levels of labour market
ﬂexibility and low levels of social security. In contrast to the pre-
vious two clusters, the countries in this group display highly de-
regulated labour market arrangements that promote the use of
ﬂexible employment contracts. Social security systems in these
countries are residual in nature and offer only minimal levels of
protection. The ﬁnal cluster (Denmark, Finland, Netherlands,
Sweden, and Switzerland) includes countries that combine highly
deregulated labour markets with generous and comprehensive
welfare state policies. By combining ﬂexibility with security, these
are the countries that most closely resemble the ideal-type of
ﬂexicurity.
Average annual per capita gross domestic product from 2008 to
2012 was included as a contextual-level control variable to ac-
count for the impact of economic growth on the association be-
tween employment conditions and health.5.4. Statistical analyses
We conducted two separate analyses. First, relative inequalities
in poor self-reported health and longstanding limiting illness be-
tween temporary and permanent workers were calculated
through Poisson regression models with robust standard errors
stratiﬁed by country cluster. Next, we estimated the cross-level
interaction between individual employment conditions and our
constructed typology through a series of four multilevel Poisson
regression models. Model 1 estimated a one-way analysis of var-
iance to examine whether there are overall differences in health
across countries. In Model 2, we adjusted for the individual-level
covariates and included a random slope estimate for employment
status to test whether signiﬁcant cross-national variation is ob-
served in the association between temporary employment and
health. The four-category typology was incorporated into Model 3,
where cross-level interaction terms were used to estimate the
potential role of different institutional conﬁgurations of ﬂexibility
and security in explaining some part of the observed cross-na-
tional variation. Finally, because the hypothesis of the ﬂexicurity
approach implies that the most signiﬁcant difference should be
observed between countries whose institutional conﬁgurations
most approximate the ﬂexicurity model and the rest of the sample,
Model 4 estimated the cross-level interaction between temporary
employment and a two-category typology (i.e. Flexible/Secure
cluster vs. all remaining countries). The multilevel analyses were
conducted for the two health outcomes independently.
In addition to our main analyses, we conducted sensitivity
analyses to assess the robustness of our results. First, to test the
robustness of our calibration of employment protection scores, we
conducted supplementary analyses with alternative cutoff points,
focusing on borderline countries (Tables S1–S4). Second, given the
loss of information resulting from the use of empirical data to
cluster countries into a typology, we ran additional multilevel
models in which the contextual-level features (i.e. employment
protection scores, expenditures on active labour market policies,
and national unemployment insurance replacement rates for the
long-term unemployed) were included as separate, continuous
variables (Tables S5–S6). Finally, due to the problems associated
with running multilevel models using a small sample of countries
(Bryan & Jenkins, 2016), we used a two-step hierarchical estima-
tion method recommended by Achen (2005) as an alternative
means of assessing the impact of contextual-level ﬂexicurity po-
licies on the individual-level association between temporary em-
ployment and health (Table S7–S8). Since they did not diverge
from our main ﬁndings, further details and results from these
supplementary analyses are reported in the accompanying Web
Appendix.
All pooled analyses include year dummy variables to account
for the impact of time on the association between employment
conditions and health. A design weight was used to correct for
sampling biases resulting from the fact that individuals were not
given the same probability of selection. A population weight was
also used to correct for biases resulting from differences in coun-
try-speciﬁc sample sizes. All analyses were conducted using SAS
Enterprise Guide 7.11.6. Results
Cluster-speciﬁc associations between temporary employment
and both health outcomes are listed in Table 3. The results listed in
Table 3 indicate that temporary employment is associated with a
greater prevalence of poor self-reported health and limiting
longstanding illness in all four country clusters. Given the large
overlap between the conﬁdence intervals, these results do not
Table 3
Adjusted prevalence of poor self-rated health among temporary workers as compared to permanent workers, by level of educational attainment (ESS 2008–2012).
Poor self-rated health Limiting longstanding illness
Permanent (%) Temporary (%) PR (95% CI) Permanent (%) Temporary (%) PR (95% CI)
Flexible/Secure 15.9 16.5 1.30 (1.15-1.49) 18.0 19.1 1.25 (1.11-1.41)
Flexible/Insecure 25.0 25.0 1.09 (1.01-1.17) 12.0 14.1 1.27 (1.15-1.41)
Strict/Secure 22.1 23.0 1.27 (1.15-1.40) 17.2 16.9 1.22 (1.08-1.37)
Strict/Insecure 25.3 23.4 1.17 (1.05-1.30) 10.9 8.8 1.10 (0.91-1.33)
Note: Prevalence ratios are adjusted for age, sex, education, marital status, and working hours.
Table 4
Multilevel Analysis of Poor Self-Rated Health Across 22 European Countries (ESS 2008–2012).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
PR (95% CI) PR (95% CI) PR (95% CI) PR (95% CI)
Fixed Effects
Type of contract
Permanent (ref.)
Temporary 1.24nnn (1.14–
1.35)
1.32nn (1.10-
1.58)
1.32nn (1.10–
1.59)
Typology, four categories
Flexible/Secure (ref.)
Flexible/Insecure 1.51 (0.98–2.32)
Strict/Secure 1.31 (0.81–2.12)
Strict/Insecure 1.45 (0.89–2.34)
Typology, two categories
Flexible/Secure (ref.)
Not Flexible/Secure 1.43 (0.97–2.11)
Interactions
Temporaryn Flexible/Secure (ref.)
Temporaryn Flexible/Insecure 0.89 (0.72–1.11)
Temporaryn Strict/Secure 1.01 (0.80–1.29)
Temporaryn Strict/Insecure 0.91 (0.71–1.16)
Temporaryn Not Flexible/Secure 0.92 (0.74–1.13)
Random effects
Country-Level Intercept 0.42nnn
(0.06)
0.42nnn (0.06) 0.38nnn (0.06) 0.39nnn (0.06)
Temporary (Random Slope) 0.14nnn (0.05) 0.12nn (0.05) 0.13nn (0.05)
Note: All models are adjusted for year. Models 2–4 are adjusted for age, sex, education, marital status, working hours, and GDP.
n po0.05.
Table 5
Multilevel Analysis of Limiting Longstanding Illness Across 22 European Countries (ESS 2008–2012).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
PR (95% CI) PR (95% CI) PR (95% CI) PR (95% CI)
Fixed effects
Type of contract
Permanent (ref.)
Temporary 1.22nnn (1.13–
1.31)
1.28nnn (1.12–
1.46)
1.28nnn (1.12-
1.46)
Typology, four categories
Flexible/Secure (ref.)
Flexible/Insecure 0.67n (0.46–0.97)
Strict/Secure 0.97 (0.65–1.46)
Strict/Insecure 0.58nn (0.38–
0.87)
Typology, two categories
Flexible/Secure (ref.)
Not Flexible/Secure 0.71 (0.49–1.04)
Interactions
Temporary n Flexible/Secure (ref.)
Temporary n Flexible/Insecure 1.00 (0.84–1.19)
Temporary n Strict/Secure 0.93 (0.77–1.12)
Temporary n Strict/Insecure 0.82 (0.65–1.04)
Temporary n Not Flexible/Secure 0.94 (0.81–1.10)
Random effects
Country-Level Intercept 0.40nnn
(0.06)
0.40nnn (0.07) 0.32nnn (0.05) 0.37nnn (0.06)
Temporary (Random Slope) 0.05n (0.02) 0.04n (0.02) 0.04n (0.02)
Note: All models are adjusted for year. Models 2–4 are adjusted for age, sex, education, marital status, working hours, and GDP.
n po0.05.
nn po0.01.
nnn po0.001.
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the associations across the country clusters. The results depicted in
Table 3 also suggest that the overall prevalence of poor self-rated
health is lower in countries approximating the ﬂexicurity ideal-
type. This ﬁnding is in line with previous research indicating that
Nordic countries, which comprise the majority of the cases si-
tuated in this cluster, exhibit better overall population health
outcomes due to the presence of generous and comprehensive
welfare state policies (Eikemo, Bambra & Judge, 2008).
The results of the multilevel analyses are presented in Table 4
for self-reported health and Table 5 for limiting longstanding ill-
ness. The signiﬁcance of the random country-level intercept esti-
mates in the null models (Model 1) suggests that there is statis-
tically signiﬁcant variation in self-reported health and limiting
longstanding illness across countries. The random slope models
(Model 2) indicate that temporary employment is signiﬁcantly
associated with an increased prevalence of both poor self-reported
health (PR 1.24 [1.14–1.35]) and limiting longstanding illness (PR
1.22 [1.13–1.31]). In addition, the signiﬁcance of the random slope
estimates reveal that the associations vary signiﬁcantly across
countries. In the subsequent models (Model 3 and Model 4), we
examine whether this cross-national variation in the association
between temporary employment and health can be explained in
terms of the institutional typology constructed in the previous
section. To test the hypothesis that the magnitude of employment-
related health inequalities varies across country clusters, we
modeled interaction terms between temporary employment and
each of the four clusters (Model 3). Taking the cluster closest to the
ideal-type of ﬂexicurity (i.e. the Flexible/Secure cluster) as the
reference group, the interaction terms were not signiﬁcant for self-
reported health and limiting long-standing illness. In the ﬁnal
model (Model 4), we estimated interaction terms between tem-
porary employment and a two-category version of our typology
that distinguishes between the Flexible/Secure cluster and the
remaining three clusters to observe whether or not signiﬁcant
differences are observed across this simpler institutional cleavage.
The interaction term was similarly not signiﬁcant for both self-
reported health (PR 0.92 [0.74-1.13]) and limiting long-standing
illness (PR 0.94 [0.81–1.10]). Thus, while we have observed cross-
national variation in the association between temporary employ-
ment and our two health outcomes, our data do not indicate that
institutional conﬁgurations of labour market regulation and social
security captured in our constructed typology provide a signiﬁcant
explanation for that country-level variance.7. Discussion
Our study set out to test one of the principal theoretical claims
of the ﬂexicurity approach: namely, that the adverse health-re-
lated consequences associated with temporary employment can
be attenuated and even overcome through the provision of ade-
quate and appropriate measures of social security (c.f. Kim et al.,
2012). Our results do not provide support for this theoretical claim.
In contrast to arguments advanced by its advocates, our analyses
suggest that the ﬂexicurity approach is not associated with nar-
rower employment-related health inequalities between temporary
workers and their permanently-employed counterparts. While
several limitations (discussed below) preclude the possibility of
formulating decisive conclusions, our results fail to conﬁrm the
theoretical claim that ﬂexicurity policies moderate the association
between temporary employment and health.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study to empirically test the
claim that ﬂexicurity policies have the capacity to attenuate the
adverse health consequences of temporary employment across a
large sample of advanced capitalist countries. Prior studies havechallenged the notion that ﬂexicurity can serve as a panacea for
contemporary labour market woes (Afzal et al., 2013; Berglund
et al., 2014; Burchell, 2009; MacAllister et al.,2016). Our study
contributes novel empirical evidence to this broader literature on
the troublesome relationship between labour market ﬂexibility
and the welfare of workers (Kalleberg, 2009).
There are at least two explanations for our ﬁndings. First, it is
theoretically plausible that there is a threshold of social protection
below which the moderating effects of ﬂexicurity policies cannot
be meaningfully observed (Afzal et al., 2013). In other words, our
results may reﬂect the fact that few, if any, of the countries in-
cluded in our analyses have social protection policies that are
generous and comprehensive enough to act as effective buffers
against the experience of temporary employment.
It is worth noting that European welfare states have experi-
enced signiﬁcant retrenchment and recommodiﬁcation in recent
decades (Bambra et al., 2010). The institutions responsible for
providing protection against socio-economic risks associated with
the operation of markets under capitalism have become less
generous and less comprehensive during the same period of time
that dramatic changes in employment relations have intensiﬁed
workers’ exposures to such risks. In fact, rather than ﬂexicurity,
the trend in most European countries has been towards greater
insecurity (Burroni & Keune, 2011; Heyes, 2013). Moreover, the
2008 economic crisis and its associated aftershocks have gener-
ated signiﬁcant imperatives for further retrenchment and reform
(Karanikolos et al., 2013). The intersection of work and welfare—
and the ﬂexibility-security nexus in particular—is a principal ter-
rain upon which contemporary austerity reforms are unfolding
(Heyes, 2013). This disjuncture between the growing need for and
declining supply of social protection has severely undermined
conditions for the successful implementation of ﬂexicurity policies
(Afzal et al., 2013). These empirical developments may explain
why our analyses have failed to ﬁnd evidence in favour of the
theoretical claims of the ﬂexicurity approach.
A second explanation for our ﬁndings—one that is not mutually
exclusive with the ﬁrst—may be that the relationship between
temporary employment, employment precariousness, and health
is fundamental in its nature. By fundamental, we mean that the
relationship inﬂuences multiple disease outcomes through multi-
ple causal pathways involving a complex array of resources that
are implicated in the social production of health and illness (Link &
Phelan, 1995). From this perspective, we should expect the asso-
ciation between temporary employment and health to persist,
even when we address one or another of the pathways involved in
that association.
As we have already noted, temporary employment is char-
acterized by multiple dimensions of precariousness (Benavides
et al., 2006; Kim et al., 2012). While ﬂexicurity policies aim to
overcome a key dimension of precariousness associated with the
experience of temporary employment (i.e. inadequate access to
training and unemployment beneﬁts), they do not account for
many of the putative mechanisms underlying its association with
health (Muntaner et al., 2010b). This may explain why ﬂexicurity
policies fail to exhibit a meaningful capacity to attenuate em-
ployment-related health inequalities (Burchell, 2009). This may
also explain why employment-related health inequalities are
pronounced even in countries with strict labour market regula-
tions. In contrast to those searching for an institutional basis for
non-precarious forms of temporary employment, tackling the
fundamental causes of these inequalities may require a sharp re-
versal of recent trends towards greater labour market ﬂexibility
and, by extension, towards greater employment precariousness.
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There are several limitations to our analysis. First, despite the
comparative nature of the ESS, it is plausible that the deﬁnition of
temporary employment and the criteria according to which in-
dividuals rate their own health may differ across countries (Jylhä,
2009; Virtanen et al., 2005). Second, the ESS does not provide the
means of distinguishing between individuals who engage in vo-
luntary versus involuntary temporary employment. Nevertheless,
contract preferences may have a signiﬁcant bearing on the health-
related consequences of temporary employment (Silla, Gracia &
Peiró, 2007). Notably, research suggests that temporary employ-
ment is voluntary for only a minority of workers and that the
proportion for whom temporary employment is involuntary has
increased over time due to declining labour market conditions (De
Cuyper, De Jong & De Witte, 2008). Third, our ﬁndings may reﬂect
our metric of ﬂexicurity (Chung, 2012). Future research should
explore alternative indicators of ﬂexicurity to examine whether
they give rise to a different set of conclusions. Fourth, our study
has focused on employment-related inequalities in self-reported
health and limiting longstanding illness between temporary and
permanent workers. Further analyses involving different health
outcomes and different labour market groups (e.g. part-time
workers or the unemployed) may generate different results. Fifth,
research suggests that the health consequences of temporary
employment vary as a function of an individual's gender and level
of education (Hammarström, Virtanen, & Janlert, 2011; Kim et al.,
2008). Due to sample size issues, we were not able to address
these interactions. However, given that temporary workers are not
a homogeneous group, there is a need for future research to
consider whether and to what extent factors such as gender and
education are related to the moderating effects of ﬂexicurity po-
licies. Finally, our results are prone to reverse causation and se-
lection effects. More speciﬁcally, it is plausible that individuals
who experience poor self-rated health or a limiting longstanding
illness might select into temporary employment (e.g. because of
the demands associated with permanent employment) or select
out of temporary employment and into labour market inactivity
(e.g. because of the demands associated with repeated job search)
(Vives, Amable & Ferrer, 2013). Due to the cross-sectional nature of
our data, we are incapable of accounting for the possibility of such
biases. These limitations make it difﬁcult to draw decisive con-
clusions about our results.9. Conclusion
Over the course of the past two decades, a diverse range of
social and political actors have promoted the ﬂexicurity approach
on the assumption that its institutional blueprint offers govern-
ments a seemingly effective means of bridging the divide between
capital's growing demand for labour market ﬂexibility and labour's
persisting demand for security (Auer, 2010; Wilthagen & Tros,
2004; Muffels & Wilthagen, 2013). Our attempt to test the
soundness of this argument has failed to generate evidence in
support of its principal claim. More speciﬁcally, our analyses do
not indicate that ﬂexicurity policies are capable of attenuating the
adverse health-related consequences associated with temporary
employment. Despite its centrality to contemporary labour market
reform agendas, there remains a relative lack of evidence to sup-
port the claim that ﬂexicurity policies allow governments to pur-
sue labour market ﬂexibilization as a new basis for growth and
accumulation without simultaneously compromising the health
and well-being of workers.Appendix A. Supporting information
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in
the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmph.2016.09.005.References
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